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Abstract 
The analysis addresses the use of Performance Incentives and Award Fees 
in DoD contracting during System Development and Demonstration (SDD).  There is 
discussion of the F/A-18E/F contract that included cost-sharing, Performance 
Incentives and Award Fees.  However, we first discuss recent GAO criticism of 
profits received on Award Fee contracts and the response by DoD and other 
organizations.  Next, the general policy guidelines established in 1969 by DoD and 
NASA that are still in effect are reviewed, as are the recommendations made by 
academic economists beginning in the 1970s. We also discuss the recent 
introduction of System Design Specifications.  While these specifications contain a 
great deal of information that can be used when developing Performance Incentives 
and Award Fees, this new policy represents a movement away from performance 
specifications and may constrain a contractor’s ability to make trade-off decisions.  
The broad conclusion of this analysis is that the intuition obtained from the 1969 
DoD and NASA Guide might be combined with that of economists when properly 
structuring incentive contracts.  This may help achieve the objectives of the 
government when there is pervasive cost uncertainty, challenging performance 
characteristics, and certain contractor actions not easily observable by the 
government. 
Keywords:  General Accounting Office (GAO), System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD), Cost-Sharing Ratio, Performance Incentives, Award Fee, 
Accounting Profit, Economic Profit, Cost Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, Cost-plus-award 
fee/incentive fee (CPIF/AF), F/A-18E/F CPIF/AF Contract, System Design 
Specification
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I. Introduction 
The Department of Defense has an extensive history in the use of both 
objectively measurable Performance Incentives and subjectively measurable Award 
Fees.  One can trace the use of Performance Incentives to the Wright Brothers’ 
contract to produce an aircraft for the Army Signal Corps.  Later, Performance 
Incentives were extremely popular with the DoD from the early 1960s to the early 
1970s.  Subsequently, subjectively based Award Fees gained popularity and 
continue to be used. 
In this analysis, we start with the recent General Accounting Office 2005 
critique of the DoD’s use of Award Fee contracts.  Following this critique, several 
memoranda were prepared by the OSD, the Navy, and the Office and Management 
and Budget, and we briefly mention some of the highlights of these memos.  At least 
one of the memos encouraged more extensive use of objectively measurable 
performance characteristics in contracts.  Significant attention, therefore, will be paid 
to incentive contracts with objectively measurable performance characteristics. 
We turn next to the history of incentive contracting, beginning with the 
contract awarded to the Wright Brothers in 1907.  From the early 1960s to the 
1970s, there was significant use of contracts with both cost-sharing arrangements 
and performance incentives.  This study highlights several of the major events 
during this period. 
Around 1980, there was a shift in emphasis to Award Fee contracts.  
However, in the 1990s, the F/A-18 E/F Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
contract employed a contract with cost sharing, objectively measurable performance 
characteristics, and Award Fees.  Such contracts are called cost-plus-award-
fee/incentive fee (CPAF/IF) contracts with multiple incentives. 
In the future of defense contracting, the pendulum may be swinging back to 
the use of objectively measurable performance characteristics; thus, we review the 
DoD cost-effectiveness model, which constituted a significant part of the intellectual 
- 2 - 
basis for the structuring of multiple-incentive contracts.  We also examine the best-
value model and include a theoretical discussion of the optimal sharing ratio that 
applies when a Program Manager (PM) knows the value to the government of 
additional performance and the risk adversity of both the government and the 
contractor.  
In addition to this theoretical analysis of the cost-sharing ratio, there has been 
a significant amount of research conducted primarily by academic economists who 
are striving to develop a complete theory of contracts. 
One model of particular relevance to our analysis develops the incentive 
contract appropriate when there is asymmetric information with moral hazard.  In this 
case, there are actions taken by the contractor that are not observable by the 
government.  These actions, which characterize a situation with moral hazard, result 
in an implicit cost borne by the contractor that would not be included in the allowable 
accounting costs by the government.  The model is typically formulated under the 
assumption that the character of the initial cost uncertainty applies throughout the 
contract. 
Compared with the DoD cost-effectiveness and best-value models, we show 
that the information requirements to structure these moral-hazard-based contracts is 
very demanding.  We also believe that the government possesses both a great deal 
of information about these contractor actions, as well as a sense of the contractor’s 
implicit cost.  As a result, these types of actions (which can also impact both cost 
and objectively measurable performance) may be amenable to Award Fee 
contracting, and, therefore, to the potential use of CPAF/IF multiple-incentive 
contracts.  Because of the effective use of this type of contract on the F/A-18E/F 
program, we summarize some of the features of this incentive contract. 
There is a new acquisition requirement that may impact incentive- and Award 
Fee contracting.  Major programs are now required to construct System Design 
Specifications.  In simple terms, these specifications lie somewhere between 
performance specifications and detail-design specification.  With performance 
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specifications, there would likely be both threshold (minimum required) and objective 
(maximum) performance values.  This range of acceptable performance values 
eases the process of developing objectively measurable performance incentives.  In 
contrast, if detailed design specifications apply during engineering development, 
then there would be limited opportunity for contractors to make trade-offs among the 
Key Performance Parameters (KPPs).  These are the key, performance variables 
during development of particular interest to the government.  
We will see that System Design Specifications typically constitute a hierarchy 
of specifications.  A question might be raised concerning the extent to which the 
lower-level specifications might constrain the ability of the contractor to make trade-
offs among the higher-level specifications.  This will only be possible if the use of 
threshold and objective performance values continues to be appropriate.  If so, there 
seems to be a role for the use of CPAF/IF multiple-incentive contracts—in which the 
relevant  KPPs are incentivized using traditional objectively measurable performance 
measures, and Award Fees are used to incentivize the lower levels of the 
specification hierarchy.
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II. GAO Analysis and Response 
In 2005, the DoD was criticized by the General Accounting Office for 
excessive award and incentive fees awarded to the contractors (GAO, 2005, 
December).   Interestingly, a significant part of the discussion indicated that the fees 
earned on contracts within a program were based on program performance.  As is 
well known, a significant portion of cost growth is associated with changes in 
requirements.  Much of these changes are a direct result of changes in requirements 
initiated by the DoD and should not have a bearing on the fee received by a 
contractor.  In fact,  a 2008 RAND analysis indicated that approximately 2/3 of cost 
growth can be attributed to government decisions (Bolton, Leonard, Arena, Younossi 
& Sollinger, 2008). 
The GAO report also notes the inflated performance evaluations on contracts.  
High-end awards are frequently given.  However, there are pervasive institutional 
problems associated with “performance” inflation in many different settings.  In one 
reported study of personnel evaluations (in which a scale of 1 to 5 was used, and 1 
is the highest performance level), about 27% of the employees received a 1; 50% 
received a 2; approximately 21% received a 3, and about 2% of the employees 
received a 4 or 5 (Lazear & Gibbs, 2009, p. 248).  Perhaps the joint-venture aspect 
of a government contract is a factor that affects Award Fee profit inflation. 
Another issue addressed by the GAO is the “rolling over” of Award Fee 
incentives.  In certain situations in which the entire fee pool planned for a milestone 
evaluation is not used, the funds not awarded are made available for use during a 
subsequent milestone on the contract. 
There were several memoranda prepared in response to this GAO analysis.  
Some of this discussion follows: 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) (2006, 
March 29): “it is imperative that Award Fees be tied to identifiable interim 
outcomes, discrete events or milestones, as much as possible” (p. 1). 
- 6 - 
Department of the Navy, Office of the Assistant Secretary (Research 
Development & Acquisition) (Jaggard, 2006, April 6): The DoN supports the 
29 March 2006 recommendation that “rollover” should be the exception rather 
than the rule. 1 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) (Assad, 
2007, April 24): “It is the policy of the Department of Defense that objective 
criteria will be utilized whenever possible, to measure contract performance” 
(p. 1). 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) (Assad, 
2007, April 24, pp. 2, 3). 
Table 1. Award Fee Provisions 
                                            
1 “Rollovers” will typically require special approval in the new Award Fee contracts.   However, this 
issue will not be addressed in this study.  
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Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President 
(Dennett, 2007, December 4): “Awards should be tied to demonstrated 
results, as opposed to effort, in meeting or exceeding specified performance” 
(p. 1).  
Department of the Navy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Navy (Acquisition & 
Logistics Management) (Jaggard, 2008, January 22): “If objective criteria do 
not exist, and a cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract is considered 
appropriate, […] the Head of the Contract Agency (HCA) must approve a 
written determinations and findings (D&F) before using this contract type” (p. 
1). 
These memoranda clearly illustrate that procurement emphasis has shifted to 
the use of objectively measureable performance criteria.  This is a return to the 
previous DoD orientation toward such incentive structures.  Furthermore, when a 
CPAF contract is judged appropriate by the appropriate decision-making authority, 
identifiable outcomes, events or milestones are considered appropriate.  Importantly, 
contractor effort is not considered an appropriate dimension of an Award Fee 
component.  Perhaps most importantly, the implementation of more appropriate 
awards is being implemented.  The guidelines associated with the April 4, 2007, 
memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics) should significantly aid this process.  
A. History of Incentive Contracting 
A brief discussion of some of the important events in the use of incentive 
contracts can help establish the context within which there is a shift back to the use 
of objectively measurable performance characteristics.  Such contracts have been 
called multiple-incentive contracts.  We argue below that there remains a role for 
Award Fees; indeed, the DoD and the Navy have experience in the use of cost-plus-
award-fee/incentive fee (CPAF/IF) contracts, which are measured objectively by 
multiple incentives. 
B. 1908, Wright Brothers’ Incentive Contract 
It is appropriate to begin the historical discussion of incentive contracting with 
the contract awarded to the Wright Brothers for building an aircraft.   The contract 
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stipulated that the aircraft should be capable of carrying two persons (having a 
combined weight of (about) 350 pounds) and sufficient fuel for a flight of 1.25 miles. 
Cost and airspeed constituted the incentive dimensions of the contract.  A target 
price equal to $25,000 and a target speed of 40 miles per hour (mph) was contained 
in the contract. However, the contractor was to gain/lose $2,500 for every mph 
over/under target. 
The actual speed obtained on this contract was 42 mph, so the Wright 
Brothers received $30,000.  The reward, therefore, was $5,000 (US Army, 1908, 
February 28).  
One might notice that there is no cost sharing specified in this contract.  It is, 
in effect, a Firm-fixed-price contract with fixed requirements for weight and distance 
and a performance incentive for airspeed.  The government was communicating to 
the Wright Brothers that it was willing to spend $2,500 for every mph over target.  
There is an implicit value statement in the contract in which the government 
communicated the value of additional performance.  If the Wright Brothers could 
increase speed by incurring a cost of less than $2,500, then, because the reward 
would increase by $2,500, they would be willing to incur the costs.  More discussion 
will follow on the nature of the government’s implicit value statement. 
C. 1962, DoD Incentive Contracting Guide 
John Kennedy’s campaign for the Presidency in 1960 emphasized the missile 
gap between the United States and the Soviet Union.  It is not surprising, therefore, 
that there was a concerted effort by the Air Force to develop missiles as 
expeditiously as possible after his inauguration.  Initially, numerous Cost-plus-fixed-
fee (CPFF) contracts were employed during engineering developments.  Such 
contracts award a contractor the same total fee dollars independently of the cost 
incurred. 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recognized the potential 
inefficiencies associated with such contracts and directed the increased use of cost 
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incentives.  These were employed on both Cost-plus-incentive-fee and Fixed-price-
incentive contracts.  In the former, the contractor shares cost with the government 
over a Range of Incentive Effectiveness.  Outside this range, the contract form is 
Cost-plus-fixed-fee.  In a Fixed-price-incentive contract, cost sharing applies until the 
contractor cost reaches the “Point of Total Assumption.”  At this point, the contractor 
begins to assume all the costs.2 
Robert McNamara argued that each dollar shifted from Cost-plus-fixed-fee to 
a Fixed-price-incentive contract would save 10 cents.3  As a result of McNamara’s 
directives, from 1960 to 1964, the percentage of cost-plus-fixed-fee military 
procurement dollars fell from 39% to 14%.  During this same time period, fixed-price-
incentive contract dollars rose from 45% to 55% (Snyder, 2001, p. 7). 
DoD procurement professionals received detailed guidance in the 1962 
Incentive Contracting Guide.  Of particular note is the recommendation for the 
increased use of multiple-incentive contracts.  The Guide states, “Perhaps no other 
DoD procurement policy offers greater potential rewards than the expanded use of 
performance incentives in development contracts” (DoD, 1962). 
As a result of the expressed importance in performance incentives, courses 
were developed by Harbridge House and other organizations to provide instruction 
concerning the use of performance incentives. 
D. 1966-1967, USAF Academy Research Reports on Multiple-
incentive Contracting 
This research was sponsored by the Pricing Division (SSKP), Space Systems 
Division, Los Angeles Air Force Station.  An Air Force Academy research team 
                                            
2 In this analysis, we will not display the graphics associated with CPIF or FPI contracts.  These are 
developed adequately in the still-active, DoD and NASA Guide, Incentive Contracting Guide (1969, 
October).  Furthermore, there will be no discussion of the Weighted Guidelines approach to 
determining target profit that applies to CPIF and FPI contracts.  We will also not discuss the 3% base 
fee frequently recommended for CPAF contracts. 
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developed a methodology for structuring multiple-incentive contracts that strongly 
influenced policy (Cook, Ackerman, Clegg, Krutz & Johnston, 1966; Cook, Clegg, 
Hildebrandt, Johnston & Zangri, 1967).  Though independently developed, the Air 
Force Academy methodology bore similarities to the solution methods employed by 
Harbridge House in its course on incentive contracting.  The reports also resulted in 
the development of an office responsible for analyzing multiple-incentive contracts.  
In addition, the Air Force Academy research efforts also shaped the 1969 Incentive 
Contracting Guide. 
E. 1968, DoD Program Office for Evaluating and Structuring 
Multiple-incentive Contracts (POESMIC) 
Based on the recommendations of the Air Force Academy research reports, 
an office was established at Los Angeles Air Force Station that was responsible for 
reviewing all multiple-incentive contracts with a value over $5 million. The Program 
Office for Evaluating and Structuring Multiple-incentive Contracts (POESMIC) 
evaluated 150 contracts within 2.5 years.  The office was disestablished around 
1972.4 
F. 1969, DoD and NASA Guide, Incentive Contracting Guide 
 This guide, issued jointly by the Department of Defense and the National 
Aeronautical and Space Administration, is still in effect. It states that a performance 
incentive achieves two important objectives: “first, it  communicates the 
Government’s objectives to the contractor: second of greater significance,  it 
establishes  the contractor’s profit  in direct relationship to the value of combined 
performance in all areas” (p. 107, emphasis in original). 
                                                                                                                                       
3 Time magazine, circa 1962, 
4 Jones (1970) discusses the history of POESMIC in his text. 
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The guide, therefore, implements the policy recommendations of the Air 
Force Academy research group and is consistent with the approach taught by 
Harbridge House. 
In the 1969 Guide, there is also an extensive discussion of Award Fee 
contracts (which had been extensively used by NASA) and a detailed discussion of 
the NASA Planned Interdependent Incentive Model (PIIM) employed on the Gemini 
space program.  PIIM is, perhaps, the most complex incentive contract ever 
employed, and takes account of the fact that the value to the government of, say 
performance, depends on the levels of cost and schedule. 
The 1969 Guide also provides an extensive discussion of extra-contractual 
influences in government contracting—such as company growth, reputation and 
influence, opportunity for follow-on business, and the utilization of available skills 
and open capacity.  Even though there was awareness of these factors, the DoD 
Guide and the POESMIC office consciously narrowed the focus in the structuring of 
multiple-incentive contracts.  For the next several years, the structure of incentive 
contracts within the DoD focused on communication and contractor decisions that 
were guided by government values.  As discussed below, these extra-contractual 
influences can be addressed by combining traditional contracts with objectively 
measureable performance characteristics and Award Fees. 
G. 1972-Present 
From around 1972 to the present, we can evaluate DoD incentive contracting 
from the standpoint of both practice and the theoretical work done by academics.
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III. Practice 
From the standpoint of practice, questions were raised during the 1970s 
within the DoD about the complexity of multiple-incentive contracts.  Around 1980, 
the orientation had shifted to Award Fee contracts. One major exception is the F-18 
E/F CPAF/IF multiple-incentive contract.   The basic structure of this Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract formulated and employed during 
the 1990s is discussed below. 
Then, as discussed below, the use of Award Fee contracts was criticized by 
the GAO in 2005.  This has resulted in a policy swing back to incentivizing 
objectively measurable performance characteristics.  
There is, however, another important development in the contracting trends 
timeline.  There has been a change from the use of performance specifications with 
well-defined Threshold and Objective performance characteristics to the use of 
System Design Specifications.  At the top of the specification pyramid resides the 
objectively measurable Key Performance Parameters (KPPs).  There are also 
underlying system characteristics not as easily amenable to objective measurement.  
Some of these measures may also not lend themselves to objective measurement.  
It seems, therefore, that there may be an important role for CPAF/IF multiple-
incentive contracts in future programs.   
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IV. Theory 
During this time period, there was also extensive research conducted 
primarily by academic economists on the theory of contracts.  Around 1972, the 
optimal cost-sharing ratio was derived for an incentive contracting context; this  
emphasized communication and valuation responsiveness, which was addressed in 
the 1969 Incentive Contracting Guide. 
Later in the 1970s, the assumption that contractor’s maximize the accounting 
profit received on a particular contract was questioned, and attention shifted to the 
construction of optimal incentive contracts. In this type of contract, there are 
activities undertaken by the contractor that are unobservable to the government, but 
which impact the cost, performance, and schedule outcomes of interest to the 
government.  These activities entail an implicit cost to the contractor that is not 
included in allowable costs, but which the contractor would take into account in 
decision-making.  As we see below, the information requirements required to 
implement a contract containing these unobservable activities is demanding.5  
Therefore, we suggest an extension of the approach suggested in the 1960s in 
which the government, with the aid of the PM and the Defense Contract 
Administration Services (DCAS), can observe many of these contractor activities. 
A. DoD Cost-effectiveness Model 
We turn first to the DoD cost-effectiveness model popularized by the Air 
Force Academy research group.  There is a basic logic associated with the 
structuring technique proposed in this model, and it is helpful to understand this logic 
before examining the graphical presentation associated with this model.  
Suppose the contractor’s share of total costs is represented by s (e.g., s = 
0.30), and the value to the DoD of an increase in reliability from 0.96 to 0.98 is $10 
                                            
5 A comprehensive and demanding treatment of this area of theoretical economics is contained in 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005). 
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million.6  This implies that the DoD is willing to let the contractor spend up to, but not 
more than, $10 million to increase reliability by the stated amount.  However, given a 
cost-sharing ratio of 0.30, the contractor will lose $3 million in profits by spending 
$10 million.  If the contractor is faced with the possibility of achieving the increase in 
performance by spending exactly $10 million, the loss in profit from the higher cost 
will equal $3 million.  If the fee associated with this performance increase was $3 
million, this would be a point of indifference to the government: the extra costs of 
$10 million would just equal the value of the additional performance of $10 million.  
For the contractor to be indifferent between the two alternatives, the appropriate 
additional profit for the increase in performance should be $3 million, which just 
equals the value to the government of the increased performance times the 
contractor’s share of costs. 
In contrast, if the contractor can increase the performance level by spending 
$9 million, it will receive $3 million for the increase in performance, and would lose 
$2.7 million because of cost sharing. Therefore, contractor profits increase by $0.3 
million, while the net benefits to the government increase by $1 million.  The 
contractor, therefore, is motivated to spend the $9 million, and both the contractor 
and the government are better off as a result of the expenditure increase.  The 
government receives a value of $10 million for the increase in performance and 
incurs a loss from the higher cost of $9 million. 
If the cost of improving performance to the contractor is $12 million, then the 
contractor will lose $3.6 million as a result of cost sharing.  This loss is greater than 
the $3 million earned from the higher performance achieved, and there is a net loss 
to the contractor of $0.6 million.  As a result, the contractor would not choose to 
increase performance.  At the same time, the government would incur a net loss of 
$2 million—equal to the additional contract cost of $12 million less the $10 million 
                                            
6 In the cost-effectiveness model, this value could result from a decline in the cost of procurement and 
operations.  In the subsequent best-value model, it could simply be associated with an intrinsic 
military value, which is associated with willingness to spend for additional performance. 
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value of increased performance.  As a result, the government would not want the 
contractor to increase performance from a reliability of 0.96 to 0.98. 
When, and only when, the increase in performance-incentive-earned equals 
the change in the value to the government of increased performance times the cost-
sharing ratio will the interests of the contractor and government be aligned.  This can 
be expressed with a simple relationship: 
Equation (1)   P(q2 – q1) = s*B(q2 – q1), 
where P(q2 – q1) = profit from a performance increase from q1 to q2, s = 
contractor’s share of cost and B(q2 – q1) equals the benefit to the 
government of an increase in performance from q1 to q2. 
There are two interesting questions raised by Equation (1).  How is the 
contractor’s share of costs determined, and how does one compute the value to the 
government of an increase in performance?  We discuss the computation of the 
sharing ratio below.  With respect to the value to the government of a change in 
performance, the easiest way to demonstrate this value is to use a cost-
effectiveness model in which the objective of the government is to achieve a 
particular level of system performance at least cost.  Then, we can discuss the value 
to the government when the problem is one of obtaining “best value.”  In other 
words, the government’s objective is to achieve the greatest difference between the 
benefits and costs of the contract.  
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Figure 1. DoD Cost-effectiveness Model 
Figure 1 displays some of the key relationships in the cost-effectiveness 
model that applies to all units of a weapons system.7  The expected cost-of-
development curve E(CD) depicts the performance level achieved as a function of 
the “average” development cost.  Increases in cost result in increases in the 
performance level achieved at a decreasing rate.   To understand this model, we 
must first appreciate that there is cost uncertainty. Likewise, a range of development 
cost curves are possible.  For example, the cost of developing performance can be 
lower than expected, and one could depict this lower-than-expected curve to the left 
of the one indicated.  Similarly, a higher-than-expected cost-of-development curve 
would be to the right of the one indicated.  In order to keep the diagram from being 
excessively cluttered with curves, low- and high-cost-of-development curves are not 
shown.  
Also depicted is the cost of procurement and operations.  This is backward 
bending because if, for instance, the reliability of a system unit increases, then the 
                                            
7 Typically, when the cost-effectiveness analysis curves are drawn, cost is on the vertical axis.  In this 
model, however, we want to emphasize that expenditures in cost result in performance 
improvements, and, therefore, display performance as the dependent variable.  Also, we assume in 
this and the best-value diagram that all future costs have been discounted to present value. 
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procurement and operating costs of the entire system would decline.  In fact, fewer 
weapons system units might be required to achieve the desired system performance 
level.  Decreases in procurement and operating costs would exert a downward 
pressure on the cost of the entire system.  The sum of the expected cost-of-
development curve and the cost of procurement and operations is the expected total 
cost curve.  Because the cost-of-development curve is uncertain, so too is the total 
cost curve.   
In cost-effectiveness analysis, the objective is to minimize the total cost of 
achieving a desired system-performance level.   At the time the contract is awarded, 
the PM anticipates that this would occur at the time when the expected total cost is 
minimized. Both target performance and target system cost (target contract cost plus 
target profit) would likely be set at the expected values of the variables. 
In Figure 1, several constant fee curves are indicated.  They are upward 
sloping because increases in cost require a performance increase to maintain 
constant profits.  As cost sharing reduces cost, to maintain a constant fee, there 
must be an increase in the system performance and associated performance 
reward. 
If one holds performance constant, and there is an increase the cost of 
development, the fee must decline.  Therefore, as indicated in Figure 1, CF3 > CF2 < 
CF1.  Given the expected cost-of-development curve, the contractor maximizes profit 
by obtaining the point of tangency between CF2 and E(CD).   
The constant fee curves must be the mirror image of the cost-of-procurement-
and-operations curve.  The value to the government of spending additional 
development dollars to increase performance is the savings in procurement and 
operations costs.  Because the contractor shares in development costs, the 
performance incentive must be structured so that the contractor receives a like share 
of the savings in procurement and operations costs. 
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Now imagine that the cost of development for every performance level turns 
out to be higher than expected.  There would be a new cost-of-development curve 
(known to the contractor, but not to the government) to the right of E(CD).  One 
would also expect the gap between the two curves to be larger at higher 
performance levels; it would be much more difficult to develop high performance.  
The total cost curve would then shift, and the minimum cost would be achieved at a 
lower performance level.  The contractor would again be motivated to achieve a 
point of tangency between the ex post cost-of-development curve and the constant 
fee curve.  In this case, a cost-of-development curve (not shown)—which is known 
to the contractor, but not to the government—would be tangent to the relevant 
constant fee curve, say CF3.  The total cost curve would shift to the right, and 
because of the indicated shift in the cost-of-development curve, the optimal 
performance level would be lower than the target level.  Once again, as long as the 
constant fee curve is the mirror image of the cost-of-procurement-and-operations 
curve, the contractor will select the cost-effective point. 
Alternatively, it is possible that for every performance level, development 
costs are lower than anticipated.  The cost-of-development curve will now shift to the 
left, and the total cost curve will move inward.  By selecting the point of tangency 
between the relevant constant fee curve (say CF1) and the left-shifted cost-of-
development curve, a cost-effective outcome will again be achieved.  We would now 
expect the cost-effective performance level to be higher than the target level: at 
higher performance levels, the cost-of-development curve is likely to shift inward 
more than at low performance levels. 
The cost-effectiveness model, therefore, has the very interesting property that 
a cost-effectiveness outcome will be achieved when development costs turn out to 
be different than expected, and, yet, only the contractor knows the shape and 
position of the cost-of-development curve when the trade-off decisions are made. 
 Most likely, this is a very stylized view of the actual contractor decision-
making process.  A contractor can be expected to make numerous trade-off 
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decisions based on known development cost versus performance relationships 
during engineering development; these accumulate to the total change in 
performance from the target level.   However, making these trade-off decisions is the 
contractor’s area of expertise.  The government’s area of expertise lies in valuing 
changes in performance.  Within a specified range from low to high performance, the 
government must be able to estimate the decline in the costs of procurement and 
operations.  Also, as we have structured this model, the government needs to be 
sufficiently knowledgeable of the expected cost of development and the cost of 
procurement and operations to determine the target cost and target performance 
levels.  However, the contractor makes trade-off decisions based on a known cost-
of-development curve.  Therefore, errors in selecting target performance and target 
cost (which includes target profit) are eliminated when the contractor selects the 
optimal values defined by the incentive structure.8   
The information requirements, therefore, are not very demanding.  We 
assume that initially, there is cost uncertainty associated with the development 
contract.  Later, when the optimal sharing rate is discussed, we will assume that the 
government and contract possess the same degree of uncertainty.  During the 
course of the contract, the cost uncertainty facing the contractor (but not necessarily 
the government) is resolved, and the contractor makes trade-off decisions.  These 
decisions are based on the value to the government of changes in performance, 
which are derived from the government’s knowledge of the cost-of-procurement-and-
operations curve.   The government does not need to know the entire cost-of-
procurement-and-operations curve, but only the part of the curve in the relevant 
range between specified minimum and maximum performance.  Minimum 
performance must still meet the requirements of the government and is called 
“threshold performance.”  Maximum performance is called “objective performance.”  
These are both specified in requirements documents.  However, in any specific 
                                            
8 If the target profit selected is inappropriate given the difference in risk associated with an incorrect 
target cost and target performance, then the outcome will still be cost effective, but the distribution of 
net benefits between the contractor and government may not be optimal. 
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contract, there are likely to be idiosyncratic factors that prevent the cost-
effectiveness model from being used mechanically.   
B. Best-value Model 
There are situations that do not fit neatly into the cost-effectiveness model.  
For example, there are variables such as aircraft weight—which for carrier-based 
aircraft have value not easily computed using cost-effectiveness analysis. For carrier 
operations, aircraft weight must be less than a certain value (threshold), and there is 
a value to reducing weight to facilitate aircraft launches and recoveries.  Lower 
weight aircraft may also increase aircraft range.  In this type of situation, selecting 
the optimal performance level is akin to a source-selection competition in which 
additional performance is subjectively valued by the government, and selection is 
based on “best value.”   
When the best-value model is applicable to incentive contracting, the process 
of determining the dollar value to the government of additional performance is 
demanding.  We can begin with the observation that at the original target cost and 
target performance level, the expected dollar value of one more unit of performance 
is just equal to the expected dollar cost of the additional performance.  However, 
when the best-value situation applies, incentive contracts require a determination of 
the value to the government in dollars of an increase in performance from threshold 
to objective.  One approach is to develop a value statement that indicates how much 
the government is willing to spend for the additional performance.  It is quite possible 
that the PM, who has a clear sense of the nature of the budget restraints facing the 
program, can determine this amount.    
Also, as noted in Equation (1), for any specified performance incentive there 
is an implicit value statement.  The value to the government equals the dollar value 
of the performance incentive divided by the contractor’s cost-sharing ratio.  Quite 
possibly, by using both Equation (1) and a detailed knowledge of budget restraints 
facing the program, the PM could develop a realistic value statement. 
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Figure 2. Best-value Model 
The diagram used to illustrate the best-value model also applies to the cost-
effectiveness model.  The relevant trade-off information is now represented  in terms 
of a change in performance ∆q.  Using the value statement for the change in 
performance, ∆B/∆q, and Equation (1), we depict the performance incentive function, 
∆P/∆q.   Also shown are two curves representing the contractor’s cost-sharing ratio 
times the change in development costs—one resulting from a change in q when 
development costs are high, and a similar curve when the contractor’s cost are low.  
These two curves are represented, respectively, as s∆CDH/∆q and s∆CDL/∆q.  The 
contractor equates marginal benefits and marginal costs when uncertainty is 
resolved.  As a result, a best-value outcome is achieved. 
C. COST-sharing Ratio 
Cost sharing is relevant to both the cost-effectiveness model and the best-
value model because at the time the contract is awarded, there is cost uncertainty 
facing both the government and the contractor, even though the cost uncertainty to 
the contractor is resolved at the time of contractor makes trade-off decisions.  In this 
illustration, utility functions are used, and we focus on a particular case—the 
exponential utility function—which yields a linear sharing rule.  In fact, it is unlikely 
that procurement practitioners actually know the government and contractor’s utility 
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functions.  However, by exploring the implications of exponential utility functions, a 
PM can gain insight into both the underlying factors that yield a constant sharing 
ratio as well as the value of the potential cost-sharing values that are likely to 
emerge. 
When there is a change in benefits and costs associated with a change in 
performance (∆B/∆q) and a change in total costs (∆C/∆q),  then the change in net 
benefits  ∆NB = ∆(B-C)/∆q.  The cost or risk-sharing issue addresses how the ∆NB 
should be divided between the government and the contractor, who are both 
assumed to be risk-averse.  The sum of the two shares equals the net benefits 
generated from the change in performance, so that ∆NB = ∆NBG + ∆NBC.  As 
indicated, both the government and the contractor are assumed to have exponential 
utility functions, which in this situation take on the form: UG = -exp(-λG*∆NBG) and  
UC = -exp(-λC*∆NBC). 
The coefficients λG and λC are the coefficients of absolute risk aversion.9  
These coefficients are called the coefficients of risk tolerance, which we designate 
as τG and τC.  It can be shown that the optimal sharing ratio, s, for the contractor 
equals 
Equation (2)   s = τC/( τG + τC). 
The government’s share, therefore, equals 1 – s.  There is also a constant 
term in the risk-sharing relationship.  It would be interesting to explore the 
circumstances in which this constant term approximates the target profit computed 
using weighted guidelines.  
One important feature of this formulation is that the cost-sharing ratio does 
not depend on the degree of cost uncertainty at the time of contract award.   This 
                                            
9 The coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the government and contractor, respectively, equal -UG”/ 
UG’ and -UC”/ UC’. The coefficient is discussed in Kreps (1990, p. 85).  The coefficient of risk tolerance 
and the derivation of the sharing relationships is discussed on pp. 169-174.  Its application to 
government contracting with Performance Incentives was introduced by Hildebrandt and Tyson 
Performance Incentives and Planning Under Uncertainty (1979).  
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results from the fact that the contractor knows with certainty the cost of development 
function when selecting the optimal q   As a result, it is the specified utility 
functions—the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and the related coefficient of risk 
tolerance—that determine the cost-sharing ratio.   Another interesting feature is that, 
because uncertainty is resolved at the time the contractor makes the trade-off 
decisions, the cost and performance outcomes are not affected by this sharing ratio.  
Similarly, target cost and target profit do not affect the final outcomes. 
As suggested above, rather than systematically attempting to use this 
methodology, a PM might use it to develop an understanding of the meaning of risk 
sharing by examining the resulting sharing ratios when the underlying parameters of 
the utility function change.  Different utility functions might also be examined to 
better understand the situation in which non-linear sharing ratios are appropriate. 
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V. Observations on Cost-effectiveness and 
Best-value Models  
In the two models, it is assumed that the contractor maximizes accounting 
profit.  Although there have been extensive discussions of extra-contractual 
influences, we do not explicitly account for these in the traditional models.  
Somewhat related is the fact that contractors are assumed to maximize accounting 
profit on the contract—as opposed to pursuing the economic profit emphasized by 
economists in their theoretical work.  Economic profit deducts the implicit costs that 
can be incurred by contractors, but which are not accounting costs.  The next model 
presented is based on recent theoretical developments and takes implicit costs in 
contractor decision-making into account. 
Let us represent the time of contract award at t1 and the time the contractor 
makes trade-off decisions as t2.  At t1, there is cost uncertainty faced by both the 
government and the contractor.  This is why a risk-sharing arrangement is 
appropriate when both the government and contractor are risk-averse.  However, at 
t2, the uncertainty originally facing the contractor has been resolved.  Most likely, 
there remains, however, government cost uncertainty.  For completeness, we call t3, 
the time that costs are measured after the contract is complete, and there is a final 
settlement on the profits earned by the contractor. 
As indicated above, changes in the sharing rate, target cost and target profit 
do not affect the final outcome in the models we have just described.  In addition, 
because the government communicates to the contractor how much it is willing to 
spend for a performance improvement, cost overruns may be in the interests of the 
government.    
The limited informational requirements of the cost-effectiveness and best-
value models are also an advantage.  This is in contrast to employing a more 
complex model in which the contractor maximizes economic profit, but the 
informational requirements to structure such a contract are demanding.  Additional 
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insights, however, are obtained from the more complex model in which there are 
contractor activities not observed by the government. 
In the cost-effectiveness and best-value models, the government needs to be 
able to state the dollar value of a change in performance.  While this sounds like a 
stringent requirement, Equation (1) shows that a performance-reward function and a 
cost-sharing ratio also define the amount the government is willing to spend to 
increase performance. 
The government, however, doesn’t really have to know anything about the 
contractor’s cost function at t1 or t2.  Figure 2 clarifies this.  At t2, it is the contractor 
that knows which of the marginal cost functions is applicable. The government does 
not need to possess this information. Yet, if the performance incentive function has 
been properly structured, the contractor selects the same level of performance as 
the government would choose if it had the necessary information.  At t3, however, 
when the contractor receives the fee earned, the government must be able to 
determine allowable accounting cost and to properly measure the performance level 
achieved. 
 If the PM is to calculate the optimal sharing rate, it must know both the 
government and contractor’s utility functions, which embody the degree of risk 
adversity for both parties.  This seems like an unrealistic assumption to make.  
However, by examining the affect of alternative utility functions on the sharing rate, 
government and contractor analysts can gain insight into the effect of the risk-averse 
utility function and the associated degree of risk adversity on the optimal sharing 
ratio.  Yet, the fact that the optimal sharing ratio does not depend on the degree of 
cost uncertainty at t1 is contrary to most expectations.  In the next, more complex 
model, this result does not occur. 
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A.  Moral Hazard and Contractor Cost Uncertainty During 
SDD 
The word incentive has different interpretations.  One view is simply that profit 
is the incentive that guides a contractor to appropriate decision-making.  Another 
view argues an incentive mechanism is designed to motivate greater effort.  Instead 
of using these perspectives, we will view the situation as one in which a performance 
incentive motivates a contractor to take actions that entail implicit costs.  Without 
such an incentive mechanism, the contractor would be unwilling to incur these 
implicit costs. 
This is the problem of moral hazard, a term which comes from the insurance 
literature.  If something—for instance, a house—is fully insured against fire damage, 
it is believed by some that the insuree will not put forth the appropriate level of effort, 
a variable not observed by the insurance company, to minimize the risk of a home 
fire.  This has also been applied to automobile, health insurance and a numerous 
other areas. It is an example of asymmetric information. 
To apply this idea to multiple-incentive contracts, we assume that both the 
government and the contractor know each other’s utility function at t1, the time the 
contract is awarded.  They also both understand the relationship between an action, 
a, taken at t2, and the probability, Pi, that a particular outcome—which in this context 
is a combination of Ci and performance level, qi (i = 1, …,N)—occurs.  Although both 
the government and the contractor know this relationship, the action taken, a, is best 
interpreted as all the relevant actions that affect Ci and qi, but is unobservable to the 
government. 
Rather than accounting profit, πA, we now assume that the contractor 
maximizes economic profit, π, which equals accounting profit less the implicit cost of 
the unobservable actions, h(a).  These implicit costs reflect opportunity costs that 
are not included in contractual accounting costs, and may occur because of the 
impact of these actions on the profits received on another contract or simply 
because of additional effort put forth by the contractor.  The effort itself would not 
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directly receive an Award Fee.  This fee would be associated with some outcome 
that results from this effort. Equation (3) depicts the relationship between accounting 
profit and economic profit in this situation: 
Equation (3)   πi = πiA – h(a), i = 1, …, N. 
Deriving the precise nature of the incentive contract is fairly difficult, and we 
only present the first-order conditions that apply when there are all-around 
diminishing returns.  We obtain: 






The shadow price of the contractor’s reservation utility constraint is a 
computed variable that requires knowledge of the minimum utility required for the 
contractor to accept the contract.  Alternatively, one could approach this situation by 
assuming that there is a weight associated with both the government and 
contractor’s utility level, and obtain a solution which can be interpreted as optimal 
risk sharing. The incentive compatibility constraint, which is contained in the full 
optimization problem, requires that the utility obtained from selected action a is 
greater than that obtained from any other action choice. 
The term, ( )( ) ( ) ,i iP a a P aΔ Δ  is a key distinctive feature of this incentive 
structure.  It captures the effect of the uncertainty associated with the contractor’s 
action.  Because of this term, cost uncertainty affects the optimal incentive structure.  
It is also a way of addressing risk explicitly in the incentive structure.   
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While this incentive structure can be viewed as an “ideal type,” there are 
informational problems in implementing this model. A PM must know both the 
government and contractor’s utility function. Contrast this with the cost-effectiveness 
and best-value model. For these two models, the utility functions would need to be 
known to compute the cost-sharing ratio.  However, we argued that they could 
simply be used to develop insight concerning the impact of utility-defined risk 
adversity.  If this model were to be implemented, however, it is necessary for a PM 
to know these utility functions to derive the optimal incentive contract. 
The government also needs to know the model’s entire benefit function, B(qi).  
This is a much more stringent requirement than simply knowing the dollar value of a 
change in performance from the minimum acceptable (threshold) to the maximum 
desired performance level (objective).   
While the implicit cost function, h(a), is not explicitly contained in Equation (4), 
the government needs to know this function to determine the optimal incentive 
function.  Knowledge of the function, h(a), is a very strong assumption at t1, when 
the contract is awarded.  However, we argue below that the government may have 
sufficient information at the completion of the contract, t3, in order to be able to 
determine h(a).  The PM can use this information in the construction of an Award 
Fee dimension to the contract. 
It is also unlikely at t1 that either the government or the contractor know the 
relationship between the probability of outcome i, and the action a taken.  
We conclude that the information requirements to implement this incentive 
structure are very demanding.  William Rogerson, one of the key theorists of the 
economics of optimal contracts, who has also conducted research in the area of 
DoD procurement has stated: 
The nature of the optimal contract varies tremendously depending on the 
precise functional forms of the utility functions and the distribution function 
[…] [summarizing the asymmetric cost uncertainty].  For normative 
purposes the problem this creates is that the precise nature of the optimal 
contract is highly dependent on features of the contracting environment 
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that government may be unsure about.  For positive purposes, the problem 
is that the theory does not generate testable predictions […]. [T]he major 
value […] has been to help clarify the underlying incentive issues rather 
than to explain specific contracting phenomenon. (Rogerson, 1995)10 
Nevertheless, the PM’s view may be that the underlying assumptions of this 
contract contain some elements of realism missing from the cost-effectiveness or 
best-value models, such as the importance of cost uncertainty, or the incentive 
effects on non-linear cost sharing.  The structural insights obtained from this 
somewhat more comprehensive model might be used to subjectively adjust the 
incentive structure.  
B. Award Fee Contracts 
Award Fees are based on the subjective valuation of contractual outcomes 
that are the result of contractor activities.  Many of these activities directed at cost 
reduction or performance enhancement may result from increases in the contractor’s 
implicit costs.  While we discuss an Award Fee received at the completion of a 
contract, these fees are frequently used to reward or penalize outcomes that occur 
at a particular milestone of the contract such as Critical Design Review.  
In fact, at the completion of the contract or at critical milestones, the 
government is likely to have substantial information about the contractor’s implicit 
                                            
10 Using hypothetical, but plausible values, an illustrative contract was structured using the moral 
hazard model. Basaran’s (1994) Performance Incentives for Warship Procurement assumes a risk-
neutral government and a risk-averse contractor.  Various combinations of high and low effort achieve 
assumed combinations: high cost, high performance; high cost, low performance; low cost, high 
performance; and low cost, low performance.  Hypothetical probabilities of each effort to outcome 
relation also provide assumed alternative cost outcomes.  Given a known contractor utility and implicit 
cost function, Basaron demonstrates that in this simple situation, the necessary computations can be 
performed.  However, obtaining the solution is difficult; in other words, applying the principles to a 
more complex setting would be very challenging.  An alternative approach would be one in which the 
benefit function of a risk-neutral government is known, as is the contractor’s certainty equivalent cost 
function and the associated risk-aversity parameter.  Both are derived from an exponential utility 
function.  When this information is combined with the variance of cost, one obtains a computable 
linear sharing rate.  Additional study of this approach in the DoD context (and one that includes 
incentives on both cost and performance) is recommended.  The methodology is outlined in Milgrom 
and Roberts (1992, Chapter 7). 
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cost function, h(a).  Both the PM and the Defense Contract Administration Services 
(DCAS) are continuously monitoring contractor activities.   While their level of 
visibility may not permit the observation of the detailed trade-offs made by the 
contractor’s design engineers, they would be cognizant of major cost-reducing 
activities and such factors as the quality of the engineers assigned to the contract.  
Either of these may entail an implicit cost borne by the contractor.  With respect to 
cost-reducing activities, the contractor might improve the design organization by 
assigning superior managers who could be used on other projects, and there would 
likely be a net reduction in contract accounting costs—as well as an implicit 
opportunity cost because these managers are not available for employment on other 
projects, which might include the preparation of proposals that might have an effect 
on long-run profits.  In our introductory analysis, it was consistent with the policy 
documents to assume that these activities do not affect the relationship between 
performance and cost.  We designate the Award Fee as A. 
Next, we consider a cost-plus-award fee/incentive fee (CPAF/IF) contract, 
which also contains objectively measurable performance characteristics.  For this 
model, we return to the situation in which the contractor knows the relationship 
between cost and performance at t2, when the trade-off decisions are made, but the 
government does not.  As a result, Equation (1) continues to apply.  The 
performance reward for an objectively measurable increase in performance from q1 
to q2 equals the contractor’s share of  cost, s, times the dollar value to the 
government of the change in performance. 
With respect to the Award Fee for cost-reducing activities that entail an 
implicit cost, we know that a successful activity reduces explicit cost, and the 
accounting profit earned by the contractor increases by s*∆C/∆a, where ∆C/∆a is 
negative.  The dollar amount, -∆C, is the incremental benefit associated with the 
contractor’s cost-reducing activities.  Because implicit cost is also a social cost, the 
government and also the contractor incur a cost equal to ∆h/∆a.  Marginal analysis 
indicates that the government equates: 
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Equation (5)      -∆C/∆a = ∆h/∆a. 
In contrast, the contractor, when maximizing economic profit, takes account of 
the fact that s*∆C/∆a is received when explicit costs are reduced.  However, 
additional profit is required as a result of the increase in implicit costs, ∆h/∆a.  
Therefore, the Award Fee received by the contractor must satisfy: 
Equation (6)     ∆A/∆a - s*∆C/∆a = ∆h/∆a. 
Using the government’s optimization condition, Equation (5), to substitute for 
∆C/∆a, we obtain the following relationship for the optimal Award Fee: 
Equation (7)    ∆A/∆a = (1 – s)∆h/∆a. 
This states that the optimal change in the Award Fee (that results from an 
observed change in the contractor’s cost-reducing activities) equals the 
government’s share of the change in the observable implicit costs (resulting from the 
change in the activity level).  There is an offset to the change in Award Fee because, 
as seen in Equation (6), the contractor has already been partially compensated for 
the decrease in accounting cost resulting from cost sharing.  Government personnel 
would have a sense of the contractor’s cost-reducing activities and their effect on C, 
and also the reduction in accounting cost resulting from these activities.11  
1. F/A-18E/F CPAF/IF Multiple-incentive Contract during Engineering 
Development  
This contract, awarded during the 1990s, includes both cost and Performance 
Incentives and an Award Fee provision. The contractor shares a portion of 
                                            
11 One can contrast numerous other examples using this methodology.  For example, the 
performance level, q, achieved may depend on the quality of engineer, E, assigned to the contract.  
There may be both, and explicit accounting cost associated that reflects the higher pay received by 
the higher-quality engineers.  In addition, q can be expected to increase.   However, there may also 
be an implicit opportunity cost associated with failing to use the engineers on another project.  This 
might be represented by h(E), and in a manner similar to the example provided, the government can 
construct an Award Fee contract that motivates the contractor to assign the appropriate quality of 
engineers to the contract.  
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development cost, and the fee is based on both objectively and subjectively 
determined performance.  Fifty percent of the fee is based on technical performance. 
Seventy percent of this 50% is based on measurable performance. This constitutes 
the Performance Incentive dimension of the contract.  Thirty percent of the 50% is 
based on a subjective government assessment of technical performance. This would 
be part of the contract’s Award Fee.  The other 50% of the total fee is also based on 
a subjective assessment of the contractor’s program management and logistics 
effectiveness.  Therefore, this part of the incentive contract  is also part of the 
contract’s Award Fee structure.  There is also a feature contained in this contract 
whereby funds are withheld until first flight is achieved.12  
2. Notional Structure of F/A-18E/F Incentive Contract 
Figure 3 displays the qualitative structure of the F/A-18E/F contract.  In this 
figure, the term “Award” refers to profits to be earned based on either objective or 
subjective outcomes.  Only positive Award Fees are shown. 
As seen in Figure 3, target cost equals $101, and there is no cost sharing 
until $105.  Likely, this resulted from significant uncertainty about the expected cost 
around the target level.  This uncertainty may result in a disagreement between the 
government and contractor as to what the appropriate target cost should be.  The 
cost-sharing ratio for an overrun is 75/25—meaning the government bears 75% of 
the costs and the contractor the remaining 25%.  For an underrun below $101, the 
sharing ratio is 60/40.  Therefore, the government incurs a saving of $0.6 for each 
dollar of cost underrun, and the contractor increases contractual profits by $0.4 for 
each dollar of cost savings under $101.  Because the government effectively bears 
more risk when there is an overrun than when there is an underrun, the contractor is 
given a greater incentive to strive for underruns than to avoid overruns.   Likely, it is 
                                            
12 Information on the F/A-18E/F CPAF/IF multiple-incentive contract is obtained from a briefing 
presented by Pat Shields at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1996, and also from DoN (1996, April 
4, Award Fee).   This information was provided by Prof. Jeff Cuskey of the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  There were subsequent revisions to the Award Fee Plan, and we have not yet received 
information on the final contract outcome. 
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easier to relate this cost-sharing structure to the insights obtained from the moral 
hazard model than from the discussion of cost sharing that was an augmentation of 
the cost-effectiveness and best-value models. 
Maximum incentive fee occurs at a cost outcome of $89.5, and minimum 
incentive fee occurs at a cost outcome of $129. Below $89.5 and above $129, the 
government bears all the cost risk.  The incentive outcome, including the sharing 
ratios, is consistent with a target incentive fee of $4, a maximum incentive fee of $9 
and a minimum incentive fee of -$2.  A $12.5 underrun below the target of $101 
increases the contractor’s incentive profit by $5, and a $24 overrun over $105 
reduces profit by $6. 
Also, note the potential for a $6 “award” fee, which includes the fee earned 
from both objective and subjective performance measures.  As illustrated, the 
maximum fee on this simulated version of the F/A-18E/F contract is $15, and the 
minimum fee is -$2. 
 
Figure 3. Notional Illustration of F/A-18E/F Incentive Structure 
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VI. Technical Performance 
We turn to technical performance, which, as indicated, accounts for 50% of 
the fee.  This includes both objectively measurable technical performance and the 
government’s subjective assessment of technical performance. 
An example of an objectively measurable performance characteristic is 
Weight Empty.  The following describes the  incentive structure over the course of 
the contract: 
1. Weight Empty at Critical Design Review (20% of the Weight Empty 
Fee) 
Performance Values: 
Negative Fee (-200%) at: 36,164 lbs. 
Zero Fee at: 29,964 lbs. 
Target Fee (90%) at: 29,514-29,814 lbs. 
100% Fee at: 29,364 lbs. 
Highest Fee (120%) at: 29,1641bs. 
2 Weight Empty at First Flight (30% of the Weight Empty Fee) 
Performance Values: 
Negative Fee (-20%) at: 30,464 lbs. 
Zero Fee at: 30,264 lbs. 
Target Fee (90%) at: 28,914-30,014 lbs. 
100% Fee at: 29,664 lbs. 
Highest Fee (120%) at: 29,464 lbs. 
3. Weight Empty at Contract Completion (50% of the Weight Empty Fee) 
Performance Values: 
Negative Fee (-20%) at: 31,064 lbs. 
Zero Fee at: 30,864 lbs. 
Target Fee (90%) at: 30,514.30,614 lbs. 
100% Fee at: 30,264 lbs. 
Highest Fee (120%) at: 30,064Ibs.
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There are also fee structures for Aircraft Reliability and Maintainability, for 
which the performance measures are, respectively, Mean Flight Hours between 
Failure (MFBF) and Maintenance Manhours per Flying Hour (MMH/FH).  Another 
Reliability and Maintainability related incentive is “Built-in Test,” which is measured 
using Fault Detection, Fault Isolation, and False Alarm Rates.    
Fighter Escort Radius, Interdiction Radius, Specific Excess Power, Launch 
Wind Over Deck, and Approach Speed are also incentivized, and all evaluated by 
comparing the outcome to the specification requirement.   
Fatigue Test, another incentive variable relates to whether the specified dates 
for various fatigue tests specified in the contract are met.  If they are, the total fee for 
this category is awarded. 
In addition to these technical measures, a subjective assessment of program 
management (particularly as it relates to achieving schedule milestones and cost 
management) and a subjective assessment of logistics (as this relates to such 
categories as commonality and supportability) account for 50% of the fee pool.  
However, it should be noted that the technical assessment of reliability, 
maintainability, and built-in test—while associated with logistics—would be included 
in the government subjectively based assessment of technical performance. 
Clearly, the F/A-18E/F incentive contract is extremely comprehensive.  It 
captures those factors that are objectively measurable, such as cost and weight 
empty.  Certain technical factors contain measurable indicators, but ultimately 
require a subjective assessment from system engineers and other specialists to 
determine fee.  Given the importance of subjective factors such as program 
management and qualitative logistics, the incentive contract provides significant fee 
opportunities for high qualitative performance of these factors.  The special provision 
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to hold back fee until first flight occurs is the key schedule variable added to the 
incentive structure.13     
One might consider some of the implications of the variability of the cost-
sharing ratio.  There is a limited range around target cost in which there is no cost 
sharing.  There is a higher contractor share below target cost than there is above 
contract costs.  This variability suggests that elements of the moral hazard model 
with cost uncertainty may have influenced the thinking of those responsible for 
structuring the contract.  However, at a certain cost level, the technical Performance 
Incentives contain an implied willingness-to-pay feature that is embodied in the best-
value incentive model.  Also, the purely subjective elements suggest that 
government personnel have the ability to evaluate factors that are not easily 
measurable but that may well be associated with implicit costs incurred by the 
contractor.  
A. System Design Specifications and Incentive Contracting   
Recently, OSD and JCS changed specification policy on major defense 
programs.  Historically, the Operational Requirement  Document (ORD) specified 
both a threshold (minimum required) performance level and an objective (maximum) 
performance level.  In addition, Performance Incentives were employed that 
permitted significant trade-off opportunities within threshold and objective 
performance.  In addition, Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) was 
implemented.  CAIV expands the opportunity to make cost versus performance 
trade-offs during acquisition.14  
                                            
13 As discussed, the necessary to meet fatigue test milestones is also included in the incentive 
contract.  A specific award is received as the milestone is achieved.  Typically, systems and 
mechanical expertise is required to asses the results of the test.  Therefore, the achievement of these 
milestones would be classified as government subjective assessment of technical performance 
incentive elements. 
14 For a discussion of CAIV  see Kaminski (1991, March 15) and DoD (1995, June 29).  CAIV is 
discussed by Rush (1997).  
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However, a number of years ago, the ORD and the Mission Needs Statement 
(MNS) were replaced with new documents under the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System.  These include the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), 
the Capabilities Development Document (CDD), and the Capabilities Production 
Document (CPD).  The ICD replaces the MNS at Milestone A, and the CDD replaces 
the ORD at Milestone B.  Milestone B initiates the program as entry into the System 
Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase begins.  Roughly speaking, SDD has 
replaced Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD).  Full Scale 
Development (FSD)  formerly occurred during EMD (DoN, 2005, Chapter 3).  SDD is 
that phase of the acquisition process when Key Performance Parameters (KPP) are 
developed, in detail, and is, therefore, the appropriate phase of the acquisition 
process for technical Performance Incentives and Award Fees to be used in 
conjunction with cost incentives.  A classic example of this CPAF/IF multiple-
incentive contract is the F/A-18E/F, discussed above. 
The Navy recently implemented  the new policy.  In broad terms, System 
Design Specifications lie somewhere between performance specifications and 
detailed-design specifications. Frequently, the System Design Specifications have a 
hierarchical structure—with Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) contained in the 
CDD at the top of the hierarchy.  Underlying the KPPs are lower-level supporting 
specifications.  Provided that both Threshold and Objective Performance levels 
remain at the top of the hierarchy, the System Design Specifications remains 
consistent with the use of Performance Incentives, which maintain CAIV objectives 
at the highest level of system performance.  
Lower-level supporting specifications may be amenable to the use of Award 
Fees.  However, at present, the extent to which the lower-level specifications 
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constrain the value of the KPPs achieved may raise an issue concerning the 
continued use of Threshold and Objective performance.15   
The new guidance contains appendices devoted to various Navy systems—
including Ships, Air, C4I, Land, and Integrated Warfare Combat Weapon Systems.  
With respect to Air, the SDS is described as “a library of specifications that define 
the performance, functional, physical, and allocated baselines for a weapon system.”  
Also, it states that “a specification tree should be included in the SDS” (DoN, 2008b, 
July 17, Appendix B). 
PMs pay special attention to risk in the SDS documents.  These documents 
include the requirement to include both a Risk Management Plan, and Operational 
and Technical Risk areas.  Risk is an integral part of the moral hazard within the  
contractor-cost-uncertainty/incentive model, but plays a much more limited role in 
the cost-effectiveness and best-value models.  
As discussed, recent Pentagon memoranda indicate that there is a policy 
swing from subjective to objective Performance Incentives.  Clearly, additional 
research is needed to better understand the relationship between the SDS policy 
and the use of objective Performance Incentives.  Will there be a range of objectively 
measurable performance outcomes that permit the use of objectively measurable 
Performance Incentives?  How can these be identified in the SDS?  How should risk 
be explicitly handled when structuring an incentive contract?
                                            
15 For an overview of System Design Specifications, see DoN (2008a, July 17).  The new policy, as  
implemented by the Navy, is outlined in (DoN, 2008b, July 17), as directed by the Department of the 
Navy (DoN) Requirements and Acquisition Process Improvements, July 17, 2008.  
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VII. Final Observations  
There is a grand simplicity associated with the view that objectively 
measurable Performance Incentives communicate the government’s values to the 
contractor.  This is the basic assumption of the cost-effectiveness and best-value 
models.  Yet, these models do not address the risk associated with cost 
uncertainty—the sharing ratio simply depends on the degree of risk adversity 
embodied in the government and contractor’s utility functions.   The moral hazard 
model does address the effect of the uncertainty associated with contractor-
unobservable actions on cost and performance and does, therefore, incorporate cost 
and technical risk into the structure. However, as we have seen, a great deal of 
information is needed to properly structure this type of incentive. 
An approach to structuring a subjective Award Fee contracts is discussed 
above under the assumption that the government does have a great deal of 
information about the actions taken by the contractor.  Even if these actions can be 
observed, the government must understand how they affect the contractor’s implicit 
cost—as well as the fundamental cost and performance variables that affect the 
government. 
The F/A-18EF contract may represent an example of a multiple-incentive 
contract that is sensitive to many of the considerations discussed.  However, this 
CPAF/IF multiple-incentive contract is not formally anchored to any of the models 
outlined.  There are elements of communicating value in the Performance 
Incentives, but at the same time, there is a sensitivity to risk and cost uncertainty in 
the cost-sharing arrangement.  Significant emphasis is also given to those factors 
that are measured in only a purely subjective manner. 
It would be interesting to examine the F/A-18EF incentive structure in the light 
of the Navy’s new System Design Specification policy.  Would the range of possible 
performance outcomes be affected?  Would an explicit analysis of risk, as required 
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in a SDS, affect the cost-sharing ratio or any other features of this incentive 
contract? The answers to these questions await further analysis.      
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